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Mathematics of Electoral Systems: Voting, Apportioning and Districting

Call

Program

Registration

Accommodation

Arrival

Venue

Organizers

Program

Downloadable program in pdf format: mes_vad_2013.pdf (including speakers' affiliations).

Friday, October 11, 2013

13:00-

Registration

13:50-14:00

Opening

14:00-15:00

Districting I (Chair: Clemens Puppe)

Sebastian Bervoets and Vincent Merlin

Can we Avoid (and Should we Avoid) Vote Swapping Representative Democracies?

Clemens Puppe and Attila Tasnádi 

Axiomatic Districting

15:00-15:20

Coffee break

15:20-16:20

Districting II (Chair: Alan Miller)

 

Péter Biró, László Á. Kóczy and Balázs Sziklai 

Fair Apportionment in the View of the Venice Commission's Recommendation

Alan Miller

Measuring Compactness

16:20-16:40

Coffee break

16:40-17:40

Preferences (Chair: Sándor Bozóki)

Burak Can

Weighted Distances Between Preferences

Sándor Bozóki, László Csató and József Temesi

Condorcet’s Paradox with Nontransitive Dice

17:40-18:00

Break

18:00-19:00

Keynote lecture I

Friedrich Pukelsheim

Proportionality and Personalization: The 2013 amendment of the German Federal Election Law

Saturday, October 12, 2013

9:00-10:30

Voting I: Citizen Candidate Model (Chair: Attila Tasnádi)

Paolo Balduzzi and Sandro Brusco

Proportional Systems with Free Entry. A Citizen-Candidate Model

Arnaud Dellis and Mandar Oak

Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization

Katsuya Kobayashi and Attila Tasnádi

The Multiple Hierarchical Legislatures in Representative Democracy

10:30-10:50

Coffee break

10:50-12:20

Voting II: Fraudulent Behavior and Games (Chair: Harrie de Swart)

 

Marina Bánnikova

Corruption, Fraudulent Behavior and Games

Dmitriy Vorobyev

Participation in Fraudulent Elections

Rudolf Berghammer, Agnieszka Rusinowska and Harrie de Swart

Spatial Voting Games, Relation Algebra and RelView

12:20-13:30

Lunch

13:30-14:30

Keynote Lecture II

Felix Brandt

Consistent Social Choice Lotteries

14:30-14:50

Break

14:50-16:20

Information and ranking (Chair: Razvan Tarnaud)

Laszló Csató

A Graph Interpretation of the Least Squares Ranking Method

Boris Ginzburg

Collective Preference for Ignorance

Razvan Tarnaud

Information Aggregation using Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule

16:20-16:30

Adjourn

 

Last modified: 2013.10.14.